Honors Senior Thesis Project

COPING WITH A WAR NEVER SEEN:

HOW THE YOUTH ARE RISING OUT OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR’S AFTERMATH

Aubrey McMahan

 

 

Grand Valley State University

 

 HNR 499

Dr. White

December 14, 2012

 

Author Note

All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement, except for those who provided verbal or written consent for their names to be recognized and their words to appear as portrayed in this paper.

 

 

The purpose of this paper is two-fold.  The paper first briefly introduces the reader to Lebanon, with a focus on the country’s economic and political return since the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990.  In doing so, it provides insight into the (sometimes contradictory) aspects of Lebanon’s culture and history which is necessary to understand the current conditions of sectarian animosity still in existence today between Lebanon’s eighteen religious clans, or millets.[1]  Following the exploration of these sectarian trends, this work evaluates the primary players preventing—as well as those working to foster—peaceful coexistence between the youngest generations of Lebanon’s many millets.

Lebanon is a vibrant nation with a rich cultural history.  To illustrate, one might easily mistake, on first impression, a stroll through the main shopping district of Lebanon’s coastal capital with that of a Parisian side street.  After all, Beirut has been coined as the “Paris of the Middle East” even decades before its post-war reconstruction, as any Lebanese is quick to point out with pride.[2]  Yet the city’s impressive post-war collection of chic Western name-brand stores, many of which can be found sitting within a single state-of-the-art shelter of the aptly named “Beirut Souks” strip mall, fall far short of paying homage to the commemoration of the genuine city souks[3] that once stood in their spot.  Beirut’s new “Jewelers’ Souk” replaced the remains of pre-war family-run store shanties, whose main trade was handcrafting authentic adornments right there in the shop, with the likes of imported Philippe Girard-Perregaux watches from Switzerland and polished and boxed ready-to-sell Egyptian Vartan bracelets.[4]  As if an afterthought, the recently-opened TSC Signature supermarket store tucked down on the first floor of the Souk Sayyour contains all of life’s necessities under one air-conditioned roof and now serves as the community’s primary market vendor.[5]

I witnessed these sights in person—the results of Beirut’s reinvention of itself—and after only one day of seeing the city I was already beginning to see how, in more ways than one, Lebanon truly is a country of contradictions.  Sponsored by the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation as well as the Washington, DC-based non-profit NGO, the National Council on US-Arab Relations, I and ten of my American colleagues were tasked with traveling to Lebanon on an in-country study visit.  What would be the first of ten full days exploring this often-overlooked region of the world was merely a scratch on the surface of comprehending the intricacies of this unique and impressive nation.

Lebanon has only a landmass of 10,230 square kilometers (an area comparative to about 0.7 times the size of Connecticut), but more than eighteen[6] religious clans, or millets, call this nation home.[7]  Even so, these millets do not share a sense of unity for their homeland as, like many other Arab states, Lebanon’s formation can largely be attributed to colonial actors of World War I.  Although the inhabitation of the Levant dates back to before 5,000 BC, the land of Lebanon fell under the control of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years as Greater Syria until the eruption of World War I.  Following the War, the region was declared in 1918 as a part of the French Mandate of Syria.  France then divided Greater Syria into multiple ethnic enclaves, with the State of Greater Lebanon reserved as the enclave containing mainly Maronite Christians.  Many Muslims and Druze, however, were included in this enclave as well.  In 1926, France declared Lebanon as a separate, but still administered, entity from Syria to be known as the Lebanese Republic.  At the height of World War II, Nazi Germany, which occupied France at the time, used Lebanon as an entrepot of aircraft and other military supplies between Syria and Iraq.  Shortly after the fighting ceased, the Levant region was visited by General Charles de Gaulle, who decided to recognize Lebanon’s independence under the influence of various political players.  Internationally, some nations feared that Germany, through France, would come to gain full control of the entire Levant region.  Internally, the people of the Lebanese Republic were getting quite fed up in being a puppet state with which the French played.  Aside from this opposition, however, there was not much else that united the Lebanese people, as the diversity of their religious faiths trumped any sense of withstanding nationalism.

Nevertheless, the internal and international demands for Lebanese independence did have an impact.  Shortly after de Gaulle’s recognition, French General Georges Catroux followed suit in 1941, declaring Lebanon independent under the authority of the Free French regime.  Yet the new Lebanese government officials were thrown in prison in 1943 for unilaterally abolishing the French Mandate and only under pressure from the international community did France finally release them and ultimately accept the independence of the Lebanese Republic.  With the French troops withdrawing in 1946 and the Allies relinquishing control of the region at the end of World War II, the Republic has since experienced “alternating periods of political stability and turmoil…interspersed with prosperity.”[8]

Paradoxically, the source that is keeping the country together and preventing its durable stability is a political structure known as confessionalism.  Lebanon is one of the few nations in the world whose politics are dictated by this system of government, in which a pre-determined proportion of political posts is allocated in respect to each religious community’s population representation.[9]  By practicing confessionalism and allotting each millet a reserved amount of seats within the government, the country attempts to “insure that sectarian conflict is kept at bay,” yet it has been argued that this system prevents governmental institutions from making progressive strides beyond religious lines.[10]  This openly criticized concept is not new; the Ottoman Empire had been codifying the practice using Islamic law since the sixteenth century, but records indicate that this system has existed since the thirteenth century.[11]  Carrying this same governance over to the new Lebanese Republic, the unwritten National Pact of 1943 defined the President as a Maronite Catholic Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Deputy Prime Minister an Orthodox Christian, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi’a Muslim.  However, even with the achievement of national independence and a recognized governmental system set in place, this was not enough to unite the ethnically diverse citizens of the new Lebanese Republic.

Much sectarian conflict was to erupt between the forty-seven-year period between the unwritten Pact and the signing of the Ta’if Accord.  One need only look at a brief timeline of Lebanon’s first years to recognize the intensity of societal strife building up to the nation’s eventual fifteen-year war.  This conflict clearly did not involve just two opposing parties.  Political actors from a wide range of religious and national backgrounds played a role in the fighting.  Indeed, the people had not only a civil war in Lebanon, but also a war on behalf of others.[12]  Since the French-controlled Syria gave birth to the Lebanese Republic, the small nation has long been a “battleground were [sic] many proxy wars were fought,” describes Dr. Tarek Mitri, Senior Public Policy Fellow of American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs.[13]  Of these proxy wars, Syria has been a major actor in the last four decades.[14]  On Lebanon’s other side, the creation of Israel in 1948 directly resulted in the displacement of over 711,000 Palestinian Arabs, with so many fleeing to Lebanese land that, today, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon constitute roughly one-sixth[15] of the country’s total population.[16]  Given Lebanon’s tight geographical position, its soil has served as the firing range and necropolis of upwards of five nationalities and every Lebanese sect.[17] 

Shortly after Lebanon’s new government’s inception in 1943, the leader of the National Syrian Social Party was executed for armed insurrection against the Lebanese Republic; the NSSP struck back a few years later with the assassination of Lebanon’s Sunni Muslim Prime Minister.  In 1968, Israel also became meddled in Lebanon’s territory, responding to a Palestinian attack with the destruction of thirteen civilian airliners at Beirut’s international airport; Israel targeted Palestinians again with the assassination of three of their leaders in West Beirut.  At the same time the Palestinian guerillas were opposing Israeli fire, they partook in brief clashes with Lebanon’s army forces, security forces, and Lebanese Christian militias as well.  Members of the Phalangist Lebanese Christian paramilitary organization, too, became involved by ambushing a bus in Christian East Beirut on April 13, 1975.  Their act, the famous Bus Massacre, killed twenty-seven passengers, mainly Palestinian, and was responsible for igniting the Civil War.

Clashes only elevated as additional communities took up arms against each other.  Between 1977 and 1989, Lebanon witnessed the assassinations of a Druze chieftain and two Maronite Catholic Christian President-elects.  The famous Christian militia massacre of hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians at the Sabra and Chatila Palestinian refugee camps took place in 1982 with Israeli military assistance.  In an attempt to bring peace to the region, Western nations also became involved in the conflict and experienced their own atrocities; bomb explosions of two Shi’a Muslim factions in 1982 claimed the lives of 241 US marines and 56 French paratroopers of the US, British, Italian, and French peacekeeping forces stationed in and around Beirut.  The nation’s capital was split down the middle in 1988, with the mainly Muslim administration ruling the West and a Christian government overseeing the East.  But the violence had at last simmered down to a degree that in 1989 the National Assembly, which met in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, was successfully able to endorse a charter of national reconciliation.  This charter, the 1990 Ta’if Accords, is composed of the unwritten National Pact of 1943 with a slight modification to grant equal distribution of the 128 parliamentary seats between the Christians and Muslims.[18]  The modification of Lebanon’s government appeased the eighteen religious clans enough that the Lebanese Civil War officially ended in 1990.  The clans have not forgotten, however, and great animosity between the groups remains to this day.  A sense of nationalistic pride has therefore yet to make it into the hearts and minds of the people of Lebanon, but they are, if nothing else, returning to a sectarian pre-war normalcy.

Indeed, such a volatile history meant that “amnesty and amnesia became a kind of state religion” as the aftermath of the War.[19]  As if in silent agreement, the eighteen religious clans in the country adopted the united mentality to forgive and forget (internally, however, each group is still playing its own blame game about who is at fault for the country’s various problems).  The groups understand that its members must get along with each other’s in order for everyone to maintain their livelihoods, so discussion of the War is intentionally avoided.  Outside the walls of Lebanon’s sectarian neighborhoods, individuals can easily identify which clan the other is from, simply by an exchange of names.  But cross-clan interactions are inevitable as people tend to their daily lives and carry out their work in the cities, and the post-war ambivalence shared by all Lebanese has only exacerbated the issue so that the sectarian conflicts of the War have become taboo subjects.  Although there is no longer the same degree of outward hostility as there was during the Lebanon War, the conflict further drove a wedge between groups who were already perpetually conscious of their diverged communities before the War began.[20]  This has only amplified the problem so much that, as one Lebanese expert explains, “the various groups are almost holding on together, not really getting along but feeling that maintaining just enough peace is preferable to fighting.”[21]  “Picture a bus,” continues the expert analogically, “where every clan is holding onto a place on the bus, a bus which is falling apart at the seams.”[22]  Every millet continues to be conscious of their frustrations and differences from the other groups, rather than uniformly mourning the shared tragedies of losing loved ones from the fifteen years of strife.  Essentially, it is a struggle for individuals to find a balance between maintaining loyalty to their clan and letting go of the groups’ past vendettas enough to work side-by-side someone from a different background.  The Lebanese’s collective adoption of the “amnesty and amnesia” mentality is, for the time being, the country’s best hope in striving for a nation which functions adequately and an economy which will return to the same thriving state it was before the War.

Despite their strained relationships, these communities, as they did generations ago, continue to assume their respective place in the overall make-up of Lebanon.  The eighteen millets, in this way, work together within the country but still maintain their division.  As a case in point, one Lebanese expert provides without a moment of hesitation, a list of the single crop each of the sects are recognized for producing: oranges, Sunni; tobacco, Shi’a; apples, Maronite; olives, Greek Orthodox; and grape vines, Catholic, just to name a few.[23]  The country has been able to get by with this approach to only an extent.  That is not to say that Lebanon’s current economy is not successful; on the contrary, it has been making consistent strides towards success, but the frictions between the religious communities are preventing them from making the most efficient national economic and political developments as the groups struggle to make a place for themselves within the country.

Because of this sectarian conflict and complexity, Lebanon as a country is also struggling to make a place for itself, within the international community.  Some can recall the last time that Lebanon was recognized for its position as a Middle Eastern banking hub and entrepot; given the country’s prime demographics, Lebanon understandably served a very distinguished role in Middle East prosperity prior to the Lebanese Civil War.[24]  With a 225-kilometer Mediterranean coastline (just under one-third the country’s entire perimeter) and the touristic diversity of warm, sandy beaches to the west and snow-topped mountains to the east, Lebanon has always had much to offer.  The recent instability of the country, therefore, has delivered hard blows to what little Lebanese pride existed from before the Civil War.  The fifteen years of strife had a tremendous effect on the country’s economy, cutting national output by half.  Additional conflicts since[25] have resulted in Lebanon being the recipient of billions of economic aid and reforms.[26]  While some pledges of these reforms have gone unfulfilled, the country’s infrastructure remains largely dependent on foreign agendas.  This is the trouble with Lebanon’s position.  As Member of Parliament and the Free Patriotic Movement, Simon Abiramia explains, such dependency “leads the future [of Lebanon] to be dictated by the international community.”[27]  Such an expectation is further reinforced when the outside world contends that the country’s independence in 1943 is attributable to “international influence and not to Lebanon’s own national will.”[28]  In fact, the lack of wide-spread Lebanese nationalism is keeping the country from healing its post-war wounds, strengthening its infrastructure, and asserting Lebanon’s place in the international community.

But until the nation’s people can set their religious differences behind and focus on forming a more cohesive, unified society, a lag in Lebanon’s infrastructural advancements will continue to remain.  Part of the problem is the exceptionally large proportion of outsiders living within the country’s borders, whose impoverished refugee camps are barring the way for new Lebanese buildings and apartments.  To civilian disgust, the Iraqi and Palestinian diaspora are plaguing their nation, and the Lebanese “fear that perhaps Lebanon will remain the refugees’ permanent home,” a logical concern given that for the Palestinians this has meant the longest-running displacement of refugees ever at more than sixty years.[29]  Although the refugees take up space, they at least do not take away from Lebanon’s pool of social security benefits, which are limited enough as it is.  Indeed, corruption is another developmental hindrance of the nation and the primary problem with the nation’s social security.[30]  Of the Lebanese citizens living in the country, only 400,000 people have these benefits—the other ninety percent have private or no health insurance.[31]  And while the aged population is looking at no retirement plan, wages and payment to government retirees are included in the government’s budget distribution.[32]  The budget additionally reserves money to “restore the wear and tear of Lebanese infrastructure,” remittances to electricity utility (approximately one-third of the population apparently does not pay its utility bill), and internal debt service.[33]

Paying off its debt, although a struggle, is not the federal government’s primary concern; it is busy tackling other growing problems such as the country’s brain drain.[34]  One very successful Lebanese businessman complains that the business “agreements created during the War are hard to implement and to agree on.”  This causes frustrating hurdles that businesses in Lebanon like his must struggle to overcome.  Furthermore, formal unemployment of Lebanese citizens is projected at fifteen percent with the youth bracket experiencing an unemployment rate of twenty-two percent.  When asked what youth’s alternatives are to seeking employment outside the country, a few opportunities were revealed.  Namely, there is currently a rise in the popularity of internships, and a recent entrepreneurship program for youth awarded $35,000 to the winner of the competition.[35]  Member of Parliament Simon Abiramia, however, admits grimly that their options in the job market are dour: “only about twenty-five percent of Lebanese students have gotten jobs directly out of university.”[36]  And with some students and recent graduates stubbornly refusing to immerse themselves in professions with confessions apart from their own, the jobs appealing to these young people are limited; unfortunately, this stubbornness has carried into the other aspects of Lebanese living which is preventing the country from completely moving forward.

It should be noted that the government has made considerable progress in addressing the brain drain concern; Rafic Al-Hariri, the late Prime Minister and a favorite of the people of Lebanon, saw that the universal education of over 33,000 Lebanese students from any and all millets were funded during his time in office.[37]  Provided that, post-graduation, they returned to carry out their career in Beirut, students were allowed to study anywhere in the world up to their PhD.  Hariri’s program not only ensured that the finest members of Lebanon’s young generations remained within their homeland, but it also attempted to fuel national pride.  As a result, Beirut fortunately experienced a developmental spike in doctors and similar medical professionals.  Medicine and banking have both become booming industries in Lebanon’s contemporary economy, replacing agriculture as the nation’s leading sector.[38]  Most predominantly, the field of medicine has experienced success because of the region’s exceptional plastic surgeons.  Plastic surgery has long been available, yet recently it has grown noticeably popular to such an extent that the similarly successful banks began providing credit to women, specifically for plastic surgical procedures (an opportunity which was very well-received).[39] 

In fact, the post-war banking sector has continued to be successful almost to a fault; originally established to serve Lebanon’s other economic sectors, the banking system has since “become its own sector in and of itself” which, explains one experienced Lebanese economist and businessman, is “never a good thing.”[40]  He is quick to add, however, that the banking sector has so far “been extremely safe until now” and “has served a strong role in Lebanon’s economy.”[41]  Nevertheless, the public debt of Lebanon, at a staggering 137.1% of the country’s GDP in 2011, has not been helped as much as critics claim is possible.[42]  The poor private debt, while not necessarily interrelated, has also been improved little with banks copiously issuing debit and credit cards to Lebanese citizens; with cards given as gifts for all occasions, whether it be a graduation, a baby shower, or a funeral, it is no wonder that there is an average of two to three debit/credit cards per person.[43]  So, while Lebanon as a political body struggles to account for its national debt, the country paradoxically still makes out with enjoying a lavish lifestyle and the rising recognition of an influential banking sector.

Like the rest of Lebanon, the country’s physical appearance, too, reflects its contradictory nature.  Rising up out of the ashes came the nation’s thriving, chic, metropolitan capital, where women get their nails done every week, the men can be seen with their hair slicked back cruising around the streets in Ferraris, and their idea of nightlife includes partying at the hippest night clubs in the entire world.[44]  Lebanon’s civilians could not move forward without letting go of their war memories through “amnesty and amnesia”—and yet, the country has not completely succeeded in putting the past behind.  Amongst all of this metropolitan gleam and glam are statues where the sun shines through the bullet holes that serve as reminders of what Beirut went through.  Between the strip malls and high-rises that have flourished where the damaged souks and destroyed buildings of the original city once stood, the few buildings which did withstand the fifteen-year chaos of the Civil War are left scarred haphazardly with dozens of spackled bullet holes.  Living in a sort of gilded age, the people of today’s Beirut have put on a show of trying hard to put the War behind them, but life is not as effulgent as they might make it out to be.        

It is important to understand Lebanon’s history in all its facets in order to visualize the complexities of the nation’s current condition and its future.  More than a decade after the ceasefire of the Civil War, the millets of Lebanon are still struggling to assert room—and recognition—for themselves in a country composed of eighteen different sects.  The weak Lebanese national identity is inextricably linked with a strong sectarian identity.[45]  Although the public sector’s confessional political system serves as a constant reminder to the country the segregations of society, the private sector has taken the attitude of adapting and forgetting the War and the running forces behind it.[46]  The president of a successful private Lebanese company feels that, at Lebanon’s current state of post-war affairs, this amnesty and amnesia approach is “crucial in an unstable environment such as this” one.  To even come close to achieving the economic success that Lebanon experienced before, it is critical for companies to “base people on skills, not religions.”  They have begun to put this into practice by asking individuals to remove their religion from their IDs, which used to be a required piece of information before a recent decree by the government reformed this policy to allow the removal of religious affiliation details from Lebanese identity cards.[47]  Policies such as this one should surely prove to be beneficial to the private sector, whereas the public sector’s internal efforts to continue sectarianism hinder the collaboration of groups and the advancement of national projects.  Yet in a society where the community leader, the local TV station, and even the market produce are defined by the religious localities, it is a commendable yet seemingly futile effort for the private sector to try to lead the way in reshaping the societal structures of Lebanon—the roots simply run too deep.

That said, one may argue that the private sector’s attempts at reshaping the country’s societal structures through adoption of amnesty and amnesia are not benefiting society in the long term.  Although this mentality of “amnesty and amnesia” may be improving the otherwise strained interrelations of community members who did indeed witness the atrocities of the War, this same mentality is being passed down to these members’ children, too.  Lebanon’s youth, who have no recollection of the sectarian violence, receive a warped view of the War and, as children’s minds run wild, they take these sectarian frustrations further.  Every clan’s youth are innocent of the conflicts which took place two decades ago, however, so now is the time for the country to encourage cross-communal interaction through a group of people who need not suppress thoughts of war anger, and mourning.  The diverse young generation in Lebanon should step in line and collectively promote understanding and openness between groups, but this is not the way of parents and politicians.  And, unfortunately, this amnesty and amnesia has settled particularly in the minds of the Republic’s young generation. 

This cannot be helped given that the (public) education system largely addresses the history of the Civil War, if at all, with this “amnesty and amnesia” mentality.  Respective of the local religions, there is upwards of three different types of text books issued to Lebanese students which explain the War with a religiously biased point of view.  Then there are the books which avoid discussing the War completely; take The Illustrated History of Lebanon, for example.  A citation from the picture book’s bibliography signals that the book was published at least eleven years after the Civil War commenced.  Yet the book completely avoids the War, marking the end of Lebanon’s history on the last page with “The Beginning of the Lebanese War: 1975.”  The last paragraph of the book simply concludes at the bottom, “The war had begun!”[48]  ­­­It is also interesting to note that the preface of the textbook consists of a few words from the Former President of Lebanon, Charles Hélou, who praises the authors for creating a work which “demonstrates a depth of knowledge, a concern for objectivity and a meticulous accuracy in recording and commenting on events.”[49]  Yet it is clear that the “objectivity” Hélou speaks of is the very thing preventing the authors from providing a satisfactory depth of knowledge.  “Certainly, all truths are suitable for telling, but much depends on the way they are told,” the former president continues to write, “Here there is no bias, no desire for polemic, but rather a constant effort to transcend all controversies.”  Such statements may be poetically accurate, but in “transcending all controversies” through the authors’ intentional vagueness, they forfeit the dysphoric facts whose studies are necessary in order to walk away from the War having learned something. 

What skewed understandings of the War the youth of Lebanon don’t receive in the classroom, they receive in the dining room.  Around the dinner table children hear stories, “facts,” from friends, neighbors, and family about the history of the War when even the storytellers who lived through the tumultuous events suffer from the warfare amnesia and are still confused about its realities.  There are no lessons to be passed down with only the one-sided retellings of this tragedy—a tradition which is consequentially doing no more than leading the youth to “distill the contradictions” in their society.[50]  A simple illustration of this “distillation” can be seen when analyzing the current progress of the government’s efforts at lowering the Lebanese voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.  Of all demographics, those most opposed to this talk of reform are the youth themselves, as such a move might result in a potentially unfavorable shifting of votes.  This thinking may be flawed, considering that as the years progress, today’s minors will eventually become of age, unavoidably shifting the voting demographic.  Nevertheless, if nothing else, the youth wish to postpone this potential electoral shift as long as possible.  Essentially the religious parties’ bitter attitudes towards each other in the 1970s and 80s transformed over time, more than anything, into attitudes of supreme sectarian loyalty and allegiance.  This mentality has continued to remain even after the formal cessation of the War in 1990, preserved in the form of a “cold” civil war which children carry with them.[51]

As the essence of these attitudes is disparating faiths, some educational institutions have turned to secularizing their establishments in such a way that the aforementioned blockades to educating the youth are only further solidified with the lack of cross-communal interaction during adolescence.  The now-secular American University of Beirut (AUB) is a prime model of this reform: the main campus’s charming little stone chapel has for years lain dormant except to serve as the occasional lecture hall; religious studies of any sort are absent from the course catalogue; and student clubs devoted to various cultures abound while the only opportunities for exploring religion is the single Interfaith Dialogue club.[52]  These wasted chances of encouraging the exploration of any of the eighteen sects that make up the rich diversity of Lebanon are further exacerbating the traditional sectarian divide.

And while interfaith discussion remains largely stagnant in Lebanon, its youth are experiencing growing difficulties in finding opportunities abroad to make better sense of open-faith societies.  A large player in this hindrance is the bureaucracy of embassies; two decades ago, it was fairly easy for Lebanese students to obtain a foreign student visa and leave the country but these days it is not so easy for any Lebanese to leave the country.[53]  When it is not the strict qualifications that prevent citizens from accessing a visa, it is the rising cost of processing the application of one; describes Hayat Arslan, the front-line activist of a national Lebanese campaign to fight the bureaucracy, “embassies would sometimes take money, up to $800 [USD], and deny someone a visa anyway.”[54]  In addition to its other benefits, international experiences naturally develop an individual’s sense of interfaith and interculturalism, invaluable characteristics denied to Lebanese youth when they are denied a student visa.  In the cases that they are able to leave the country—and it is very common for every family to hassle with embassies until they ensure that at least one of their children is provided with a better education abroad—these enlightened individuals unfortunately do not often return home.[55]  As the experiences of these students’ exposure to interfaith societies are not brought back to the Lebanese communities, the youth still growing up in Lebanon continue to receive the same one-sided understandings in the classroom and the kitchen.

The media, too, bar a potentially effective means of cross-sectarian understanding.  While outside censorship of social media remains a huge issue, Managing Editor of news portal Now Lebanon Hanin Ghaddar attests that “self-censorship is becoming even more dangerous.”[56]  Lebanon’s various media establishments are owned by politicians and political factions who naturally promote politicians’ agendas.  Although there is also pluralism and factionalism present in the media, which allows careful observers of the press to get the other side of the stories, local sectarian political propaganda dominate the airwaves so that each community is led to follow and interpret very much whatever their local politicians air on their channels.  Segregated media has spilled over to the social medium as well, particularly through sites such as Facebook and blogs which provide Lebanese with a cheap and easy means to develop an interfaith understanding virtually.  Yet, Ghaddar finds that instead of the youth gaining a better sense of religious tolerance through these sites, they are rather using them as an outlet to express these sectarian frustrations so that social media “actually aggravates violent sectarian rhetoric.”  With “drive-by confessionalism” and “spin” controlling the TVs, radios, and newspapers, and harsh accusations filling up online discussion boards, the young Lebanese generation finds its options to consciously seek peaceful cross-communal interaction hindered.[57]

Face-to-face interactions between communities’ members have been much more successful, yet these discussions only revolve around a safe, apolitical sphere of unifying topics.[58]  One of the most common topics which students find they can rally about, regardless of their religion, is the call for electricity reform; the current infrastructure has for the past twenty-three years resulted frequently in reoccurring and lengthy power outages (sometimes up to weeks) all across the country.  Angry citizens have taken to blocking off airport roads and burning tires in the streets.  But to little avail, these efforts instill more a sense of worth in the protestors than they do sense into the government, who have thrown around talk of privatizing the sector but have done little else about the matter.  All of the aforementioned factors very much hinder the desire of youth to get involved in politics and limit the opportunities for them to demand change in the administrative systems that are dictating their lives.

As the “amnesty and amnesia” factor is the underlying element in these hindrances, and is coming to embed itself in the minds of the post-war generations ever stronger than before, auspiciously there actors inside Lebanon who are working within their means to de-stigmatize sectarianism and encourage cross-sectarian interaction across the country.[59]  Many advocates believe quite simply that universalizing the history books would tackle a large part of the problem.  A documentary titled The History Book explores in depth the discrepancies within the various history textbooks used around Lebanon in order to bring light to the issue and stimulate action on resolving it.  Like the nationalized electricity, there has been talk of privatizing the education sector, but unfortunately not much progress has been made.

A seemingly more successful approach in working to remember the War is UMAM Documentation & Research (UMAM D&R), a non-profit organization co-founded by Lokman Slim in 2004.  UMAM D&R’s paramount aim is to create an archive comprised of various materials—“documents” in the broadest possible term—that represent critical records of Lebanon’s recent sociopolitical history.  The organization strives to make its archive accessible to every interested demographic to ensure that the deeds and misdeeds of the Civil War, a subject long considered taboo in Lebanon, finally can be approached openly and peacefully.[60]  Located adjacent to UMAM UD&R’s southern Beirut offices is The Hangar, a multi-use, multifaceted, and highly chic venue that showcases and enables local and international artists, speakers and musicians whose presentations and performances are essential in helping to overcome formidable and enduring social obstacles.  In addition, the facility houses a comprehensive reference library that contains the burgeoning archives still being assembled by the organization.[61]

In a meeting with Mr. Slim, he stated that his commitment to such a ponderous undertaking represented an important “way to criticize the War, and [upend] the politics and people [who] try to ignore the facts [by eschewing] political discourse.”[62]  In addition to hosting war-related exhibitions in The Hangar and publishing collections such as Missing—a picture book comprised of photographs of just a few hundred of an estimated more than 150,000 Lebanese who were killed in the Civil War—UD&R is finding ever more creative approaches to encourage commemoration of the War.[63]^,[64]  This past year’s main project consists of a bus which transports visitors to significant destinations from the War’s history (thanks to the assistance of the UN Development Programme) as a tribute to the famous Bus Massacre which sparked the Civil War.[65]  Appropriately named The Bus Takes the Podium…, the project is “intended to engage audiences of all ages but particularly youths, who post [sic] the greatest risk to Lebanon’s future if we permit them to forget the bloody lessons of our past—the ones so many of us choose to forget” [emphasis in original].[66]

While on the subject, Slim also spoke of Memory for the Future, a national civil peace association whose goal is to “reconcile the Lebanese with their history, so that they can begin looking together in solidarity toward a national future.”[67]  Recognizing that “‘the past remains present’ as a source of division in Lebanese society,” the association’s primary projects outside of hosting remembrance events are working to officially designate April 13^th as Remembrance Day and erect a unifying national monument in respect of those wounded or missing from the War.  One artist who has been working on the national memorial, Alfred Tarazi, emphasizes the need of addressing this bloody part of Lebanon’s past: “especially for the young generation of Lebanese who didn’t live through the war and all the kidnappings.  It’s important they know about what the war caused, because they’ll be the first ones to take up arms,” he claims, hinting that current conditions in Lebanon are steering towards the possibility of renewed civil violence.[68] 

Even more eminent is the need for youth to take it upon themselves to make the changes in their society that are so necessary to prevent the likelihood of a future violent outbreak.  “If Lebanon wants to reform the sectarian system,” explains writer and journalist Michael Young, it must be done through a “sectarian prism” in that every sect must learn to accept the bad and try to change it by recognizing and working with the good.[69]  Abiramia adds to this, explaining that currently “the stigmas prevent the sectarian style from making a breakthrough;” that is to say, people feel the need to always side with and defend their own communities, which prevents people from accepting the very mistakes—“although they most certainly think them, they don’t admit them”—necessary to allow the following generations to learn from these mistakes.[70]  Unfortunately, many activists claim that Lebanese politicians are proving to be unhelpful in supporting educational opportunities for the public to learn from the past.[71]  Lebanon’s current President has arranged for dialogue to take place between the sects in order to try and smooth out the sectarian cleavages that have continued to exist in Parliament.  Yet the public of Lebanon do not anticipate that any long-term effects will come out of such efforts.

Advocates of change feel that in order to see effective improvement in the public sector, electoral reform is necessary.[72]  Youth Coordinator of the Democratic Renewal Movement (DRM) Ayman Mhanna sheds some more light on this matter.  Currently, the majority of the flaws lie in the voting system, as no official ballots exist during elections, but parties offer prepared ballots which are easy to track.  Additionally, Lebanon runs by a winner-takes-all-seats system so newcomers have no chance, especially considering that, as Hayat Arslan, Head of Public Relations and Media Committee of the National Commission for Lebanese Women, adds, the “very bad” relationship between representatives and their constituents is in large part due to the fact that in reality it is bribes that are the votes.[73]  While Arslan and her two daughters’ social activist efforts include writing books about democracy for children and opening up opportunities for youth to get involved in international leadership seminars, the Democratic Renewal Movement has taken the approach of reforming the public sector from the inside out.[74]

This rather new political party prides itself on being one of the few political parties that has the ability to speak “across the political spectrum,” due to its unusual cross-sectarian nature.[75]  In fact, it seems DRM thrives off this foundation.  Putting their religions aside allows the members to focus on political and economic reforms that cross confessional lines such as electricity, road systems, and education, which naturally appeal to a wide variety of voters who do not see their concerns addressed by mainstream political parties.  DRM’s youth branch offers a base for Lebanon’s youngest voting generations (eighteen – thirty-two) to flex their interests in the public sector without the community affiliation getting in the way.  In fact, they participate in conferences abroad such as the ones organized by British NGO International Alert, which encourage young Lebanese leaders to work on reconciliation, and within Lebanon they often reach out to university organizations which share similar platforms as that of DRM.  Through such avenues, Mhanna finds that Lebanese youth are finding ways to rise above the sectarianism that is holding the older generations down and is allowing the youth to make changes in their society that they wish to see.

Another avenue the youth have taken to influence politics is participating in the An-Nahar-run Youth Shadow Government.  Envisioned by the late journalist and politician Gebran Tueni,[76] YSG was created in 2006 to empower the youth by training emerging leaders and future policy-makers.[77]  “Even today, there are not many concrete goals seen ahead for youth,” explains Jad El Cham, an alumna of the program.  YSG uses its unique relationship with Parliament to connect around twenty Lebanese students, regardless of religion, between the ages of twenty and twenty-seven with politicians in office to serve as watchdogs and propose progressive projects and reforms.[78]  During the program, the YSG participants serve as “a pressure point to get the government and ministers to react;” upon completion of their participation, the students go on to become heads of municipalities, advisors to ministers, and even founders of their own political parties.[79]  The Youth Shadow Government is clearly playing a direct part in shaping the upcoming political scene by connecting youth to today’s political players and mentoring them as Lebanon’s future leaders of tomorrow.

Indeed, independent organizations like the Youth Shadow Government and cross-sectarian political parties such as the Renewal Democratic Movement, are working to improve the immediate governmental system from the outside.  A rare exception to government politicians’ ignorance of the youth’s cross-communal challenges is the Ministry of Youth & Sports.[80]  One representative, Abiramia, reports that the Ministry organizes and implements sports opportunities to encourage universal youth participation and engagement in effective discussion.[81]  Even greater, the Ministry maintains a partnership with the government-recognized Youth Forum for National Youth Policy and it is the efforts of the Youth Forum which really shine.[82]  Page twenty-one of the Youth Forum for Youth Policy: The Document of the Youth Policy in Lebanon, titled “Social Integration & Political Participation,” reads:

            Young people consider that confessional and sectarian divisions constitute an essential obstacle that prevents their active participation in the various life aspects, which is crucial in their practice of their full citizenship rights.  Hence, it is necessary to work on encouraging social integration and eliminating all legal and administrative obstacles that marginalize the role of youth in life.[83]

Recognizing this, the Youth Forum “works towards incorporating the youth policy recommendations into the Lebanese constitution and laws” while also serving as “a space where Lebanese youth coming from different backgrounds meet and engage in dialogue over youth issues.”[84]

It is optimistic that the document claims “this collective, systematic and cumulative work…has paid off” yet in reality it is difficult to ascertain how effective a role the Youth Forum has actually played in enhancing the quality of Lebanon’s future generation.[85]  For one thing, the substance of the document merely bullet points recommendations of how to go about creating a greater youth-friendly Lebanon.  For another, the content of the Education and Culture section lacks any reference to remembering the War and standardizing student history books, a move which critics argue would be a sure-fire method of breaking down the confessional boundaries.  The reforms proposed in the document of the Youth Forum are extremely comprehensive and its position as a space for peaceful dialogue is commendable, yet the principal change agents of Lebanese societal divisions seem to be non-governmental entities.[86]

With the public sector’s progress discouraging, men and women not holding any political office have taken it upon themselves to make the changes they wish to see in their world.  It’s these men and women who “instill a sense of hope back into individuals” that the prolonged pre-war mentalities have so long stymied.[87]  There “will not be peace among religions without peace among nations,” preaches Dr. Mitri.[88]  Echoing this thought, Ayman Mhanna considers that even after the fifteen-year-long atrocities of the Lebanese Civil War, “little has changed” because people still claim they “would stand up for the same things and do the same thing now as before the War.”[89]  “Until these thought processes change,” he adds, “no progress will be made.”  Common to communities abroad, the societies of Lebanon, too, endure the vicious circular thought process that “people don’t attempt to make change because they don’t think change will happen,” which has left the exhausting moral responsibilities of enacting change to Lebanese individuals few and far between.[90]  Despite this, activists conceive that it is only a matter of time before the “very strong civil society” composing Lebanon catches on.[91]  When questioned why she is so heavily involved and dedicated to this cause given that the attitudes of today are merely extensions of the vehement past, Ghaddar states quite simply, “Lebanon is our home.  We have no choice but to keep trying.”[92]

Bibliography

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Antelava, Natalia.  “Lebanon ‘moves right way’ on ID.”  BBC News, February 24, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7906125.stm. 

Beirut Souks.  Solidere.  Last modified 2012.  http://www.solidere.com/beirut-souks/outlets-listing/.

“The Bus Takes the Podium…,” UMAM Documentation & Research, last modified 2010, http://www.umam-dr.org/projectInfo.php?fromTab=upcomingProjects&projectId=152.

CIA.  “Lebanon.”  CIA World Factbook.  Accessed August 5, 2012. ciaworldfactbook.us/asia/lebanon.

CIA.  “Middle East :: Lebanon.”  CIA World Factbook.  Last modified December 5, 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.

The Daily Star.  “Lebanese Mark Start of Civil War With Calls For Awareness.”  The Lebanese Inner Circle (blog).  http://theinnercircle.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/lebanese-mark-start-of-civil-war-with-calls-for-awareness/.

De Freige, Nayla and Maria Saad.  Illustrated History of Lebanon.  Translated by Daphne Saghbini.  Messageries du Moyen-Orient, n.d.

Fabricant, Florence.  “Store Review: TSC Signature, in Beirut.”  The New York Times Travel, December 1, 2010.  http://travel.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/travel/05signature-foraging.html.

Harb, Imad.  “Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects.”  United States Institute of Peace.  Published March, 2006. http://www.usip.org/publications/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects.

Llewellyn, Tim.  Spirit of the Phoenix: Beirut and the Story of Lebanon.  London: I.B.Tauris, 2010.

McDowall, David and Claire Palley.  “The Palestinians.”  Minority Rights Group Report 24 (1987): 10.

McMahan, Aubrey.  “The Land of Lebanon—.” Head First: Diving Into the Life and Language of Lebanon (blog).  http://headfirstadventures.blogspot.com/2012/06/land-of-lebanon.html.

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[1] A millet in this context is defined as a “religious community,” derived from the former Ottoman Empire (1453-1918), when the people were forced to belong to a community which was “organized under its own head and observed its own laws.”  From John Pike, “Lebanon – History,” Global Security, last modified September 7, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/lebanon/history.htm.

[2] Jad El Cham, meeting with source, June 27, 2012.                    

[3] The term souk refers to an open-air market place typical of Persian and Arabian towns.

[4] Beirut Souks, Solidere, last modified 2012, http://www.solidere.com/beirut-souks/outlets-listing/.

[5] Florence Fabricant, “Store Review: TSC Signature, in Beirut,” The New York Times Travel, December 1, 2010, http://travel.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/travel/05signature-foraging.html.

[6] The eighteen millets of Lebanon that the author refers to are the six predominant Muslim sects—Shi’a, Sunni, Druze, Isma’ilite, Alawite, and Nusayri—and the twelve main Christian sects—Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, and Protestant.  From CIA, “Lebanon,” CIA World Factbook, accessed August 5, 2012, ciaworldfactbook.us/asia/lebanon.

[7] CIA, “Lebanon.”

[8] Ibid.

[9] Imad Harb, “Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects,” United States Institute of Peace, published March, 2006, http://www.usip.org/publications/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects.

[10] CIA, “Lebanon.”

[11] Harb.

[12] Michael Young, e-mail message to author, August 6, 2012.

[13] Tarek Mitri, meeting with source, June 26, 2012.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Lebanon relies on its national elections as censuses, not having conducted a formal census in decades mainly because they are chagrined with how many Palestinians are present in the region relative to Lebanese nationals.

[16] David McDowall and Claire Palley, “The Palestinians,” Minority Rights Group Report 24 (1987): 10; Mariam Klait, meeting with source, June 21, 2012.

[17] Tim Llewellyn, Spirit of the Phoenix: Beirut and the Story of Lebanon (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), viii-x.

[18] Harb.

[19] Lokman Slim, meeting with source, June 25, 2012.

[20] Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[21] Anonymous, meeting with government official, June 2012.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[24] CIA, “Lebanon.”

[25] The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, for example, led to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait providing the Lebanese central bank with $1.5 billion USD in concessional loans to help maintain confidence in the Lebanese currency while various donors pledged nearly $1.8 billion in recovery aid later that same year.  From CIA, “Lebanon.”

[26] CIA, “Lebanon.”

[27] Simon Abiramia, meeting with source, June 29, 2012.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Anonymous, meeting with government official, June 2012; Llewellyn, Spirit of the Phoenix, 102; Bill Corcoran, meeting with source, June 28, 2012.

[30] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[31] Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[34] Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[35] Ibid.; Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[36] Simon Abiramia, meeting with source, June 29, 2012.

[37] Office of Information and Public Relations, American University of Beirut, last modified March 19, 2004, http://staff.aub.edu.lb/~webinfo/inthnews/local%20news/feb05.html.

[38] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012; Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[39] Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[40] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[41] Ibid.

[42] From CIA, “Middle East :: Lebanon,” CIA World Factbook, last modified December 5, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.

[43] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[44] Aubrey McMahan, “The Land of Lebanon—,” Head First: Diving Into the Life and Language of Lebanon (blog), http://headfirstadventures.blogspot.com/2012/06/land-of-lebanon.html.

[45] Tarek Mitri, meeting with source, June 26, 2012.

[46] Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[47] Natalia Antelava, “Lebanon ‘moves right way’ on ID.”  BBC News, February 24, 2009.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/

2/hi/middle_east/7906125.stm. 

[48] Nayla de Freige and Maria Saad, Illustrated History of Lebanon, trans. Daphné Saghbini (Messageries du Moyen-Orient, n.d.), 55.

[49] Ibid 3.

[50] Anonymous, meeting with expert on Lebanon, June 2012.

[51] Michael Young, meeting with source, June 25, 2012.

[52] Student Clubs List, American University of Beirut, last modified January, 2011, http://www.aub.edu.lb/sao/activities/org/clubs/Pages/clubs_list.aspx.

[53] Young, meeting with source.

[54] Hayat Arslan, meeting with source, July 2, 2012.  In an e-mail message to the author, August 10, 2012, Arslan emphasizes that the embassies’ treatment “is not restricted to youth only, it is general.  So all Lebanese suffered from the arrogance of the Consular sections of the Embassies & the high fees collected & visas denied.”

[55] Anonymous, meeting with economist in Lebanon, June 2012.

[56] Hanin Ghaddar, meeting with source, June 25, 2012.

[57] Harb.

[58] Ghaddar.

[59] Lokman Slim, meeting with source, June 25, 2012.

[60] “About Us,” UMAM Documentation & Research, last modified 2010, http://www.umam-dr.org/aboutUs.php?location=aboutUs.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Lokman Slim, meeting with source, June 25, 2012; Lokman Slim, e-mail message to author, September 7, 2012.

[63] “About Us,” UMAM Documentation & Research.

[64] CIA, “Lebanon.”

[65] “The Bus Takes the Podium…,” UMAM Documentation & Research, last modified 2010, http://www.umam-dr.org/projectInfo.php?fromTab=upcomingProjects&projectId=152.

[66] Ibid.

[67] The Daily Star, “Lebanese Mark Start of Civil War With Calls For Awareness,” The Lebanese Inner Circle (blog), http://theinnercircle.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/lebanese-mark-start-of-civil-war-with-calls-for-awareness/.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Young.

[70] Simon Abiramia, meeting with source, June 29, 2012.

[71] The Daily Star, “Lebanese Mark Start of Civil War With Calls For Awareness.”

[72] Ayman Mhanna, meeting with source, June 26, 2012.

[73] Ibid.; Arslan.

[74] Arslan.

[75] Mhanna.

[76] Late MP Gebran Tueni was actually assassinated in a car bomb explosion in 2005, before this vision could come to life.  Gebran’s briefcase was one of the few things which remained after the explosion, and contained the general outline and by-laws of YSG.  Shortly thereafter, YSG was created as a tribute to his memory.  (Jad El Cham, e-mail to author, August 8, 2012).  

[77] Jad El Cham, meeting with source, June 27, 2012.

[78] Ayad Wakim, meeting with source, June 27, 2012.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Youth Advocacy Process- YAP et al., Youth Forum for Youth Policy: The Document of the Youth Policy in Lebanon, (Endorsed by the Lebanese Council of Ministers on April 3, 2012), 4.

[81] Simon Abiramia, meeting with source, June 29, 2012.

[82] Youth Advocacy Process- YAP et al., Youth Forum for Youth Policy: The Document of the Youth Policy in Lebanon, 4.

[83] Ibid 21.

[84] 5.

[85] 6.

[86] 5.

[87] Ghaddar.

[88] Mitri.

[89] Mhanna.

[90] Arslan.

[91] Anonymous, meeting with businessman in Lebanon, June 2012.

[92] Ghaddar.